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ABSTRACT 
 Currently, the Marine Corps and the Department of Defense do not leverage 
human-machine team pairing during the collection of human intelligence. Consequently, 
they may miss or not exploit key information gained from human sources during times of 
both peace and war. This research aims to examine the viability of leveraging 
human-machine team pairing during intelligence gathering operations with particular 
focus on detecting human deception. It provides an in-depth overview of the current 
unclassified practices used to detect deception, evaluates the viability of incorporating 
emerging technologies, and proposes an operator function model and employment model 
for a human-machine team pair to improve deception detection performance during 
enemy prisoners of war interviews. 
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All warfare is based on deception. 
—Sun Tzu, Art of War 
War is deceit. 
—Prophet Muhammad 
A. PURPOSE 
Detecting deception is a difficult task for a human to do accurately. Though there have 
been mixed results in studies, on average, people can only detect deception about 50% of the time.1 
This statistic does not change for intelligence operations conducted by military professionals. 
Currently, the techniques and procedures implemented by the military call for the utilization of the 
information gained or verified by enemy prisoners of war to conduct continuing operations. Due 
to the accuracy of current practices for detecting deception there is a certain level of risk associated 
with acting upon the knowledge gained through the interrogations or conversations with hostile 
combatants. Reducing this risk by improving deception detection accuracy could lead to more 
successful tactical engagements. To accomplish this, artificial intelligence (AI) and other 
technological advancements may provide an opportunity to leverage human-machine team pairing 
during intelligence gathering operations.2 Currently, the Marine Corps and the Department of 
Defense (DOD) do not optimally employ human-machine team pairing during the collection of 
 
1 Shannon C. Houck et al., “When Beliefs Lead to (Im)Moral Action: How Believing in Torture’s Effectiveness 
Shapes the Endorsement of Its Use,” Political Psychology 40, no. 6 (2019): 1315–39, 
https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12590; Aldert Vrij et al., “Psychological Perspectives on Interrogation,” Perspectives 
on Psychological Science 12, no. 6 (November 2017): 927–55, https://doi.org/10.1177/1745691617706515; 
Verónica Pérez-Rosas et al., “Deception Detection Using Real-Life Trial Data,” in Proceedings of the 2015 ACM on 
International Conference on Multimodal Interaction, Seattle, WA, USA: ACM, 2015, 59–66, 
https://doi.org/10.1145/2818346.2820758. 
2 Pérez-Rosas et al., “Deception Detection Using Real-Life Trial Data”; Judee Burgoon et al., “Detecting 
Deception in the Military Infosphere: Improving and Integrating Human Detection Capabilities with Automated 






human intelligence (HUMINT).3 Consequently, the Marine Corps and the DOD may miss and 
therefore not exploit key information gained from human sources during times of peace and war.  
The purpose of this study is threefold. First, this thesis provides an in-depth overview of 
the current unclassified practices the intelligence communities (IC), the DOD, and the Marine 
Corps use to detect deception during operations. Second, this thesis will evaluate the potential 
benefits of leveraging human-machine team pairing to detect deception during intelligence 
gathering operations. Third, it will propose a method of integrating the current emerging 
technologies to aid human operators in human deception detection during interrogations and 
interviews.  
B. RELEVANCE  
Throughout history, deception has played a key role in gaining a strategic advantage on the 
battlefield, from the trojan horse used by the Greeks to Operation OVERLORD during World War 
II.4 When militaries achieve deception, they gain an advantage over their enemies. For militaries 
to deny their enemies this advantage and prevent deception from contaminating intelligence, there 
is a requirement for accurate intelligence collection and assessments. One of the most informative 
lines of intelligence is HUMINT. However, humans that provide such intelligence often employ 
deception tactics such as lying and evasiveness. Therefore, to effectively inform intelligence 
operations it is critical to detect when a person is lying or being evasive. One potential way to 
detect deception accurately would be the employment of technological advances.5  
The advent of the personal computer and other information technologies has caused a 
fundamental shift in warfare. From the integration of software in the F-35, to the use of unmanned 
aerial systems (UAS), to the use of computers as diagnostic gear for vehicles, technological 
advancements across battlespaces have worked to modernize and optimize the battlefield. These 
 
3 S. Keller-McNulty, “Quest for Truth: Deception and Intent Detection,” (Ft. Belvoir, VA: The MITRE 
Corporation; JASON Program Office, October 29, 2008), https://fas.org/irp/agency/dod/jason/quest.pdf; Richard 
Potember, “Perspectives on Research in Artificial Intelligence and Artificial General Intelligence Relevant to DOD” 
(Alexandria, VA: The MITRE Corporation; JASON Program Office, January 2017), 
https://fas.org/irp/agency/dod/jason/ai-dod.pdf. 
4 William B Breuer, Hoodwinking Hitler: The Normandy Deception (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1993). 
5 Keller-McNulty, “Quest for Truth: Deception and Intent Detection.” 
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technologies, when employed correctly, have mitigated risks for friendly forces and civilian 
personnel. The human counterintelligence (CI) field is one area within the warfighting domain that 
seems untouched by these new advances. The DOD, and the Marine Corps, should identify the 
requirements for private industry to design new technologies for integration into HUMINT 
operations, as they have the potential to give the force an asymmetric advantage.  
C. METHODOLOGY AND SCOPE 
The research methodologies this thesis employs ties directly to its purposes. The first 
purpose as outlined above, provides an in-depth overview of the current unclassified practices the 
intelligence communities within the DOD and the Marine Corps use to detect deception during 
operations. It will do this through an in-depth review of Joint Publications (JP), Marine Corps and 
Army service doctrine, and Intelligence Community Directive (ICD)-203. The second purpose of 
this thesis will be to evaluate the potential benefits of leveraging human-machine team pairing to 
detect deception during human intelligence gathering operations. To accomplish this, I examine 
(a) the methodologies used to conduct interviews and interrogations, (b) the most current 
technologies proven to increase the accuracy in detecting deception, and (c) the trust relationship 
between humans and machines. The third purpose is to propose a method of integrating the current 
emerging technologies to aid human operators in the detection of deception during interrogations 
and interviews. This proposal will consist of two models, an employment model, and a system 
design model. The employment model’s design gives initial insights into appropriate roles and 
responsibilities for human and machine agents, within the developed system, Warfare Integrated 
Lie Detection System (WILDS). The proposed system design is based on an operator function 
model (OFM), stemming from a human factors systems engineering approach.   
There are three major approaches to detecting deception: human only, machine only, and 
a mix of human and machine paired together. While there is a vast amount of research pertaining 
to human-only and machine-only deception detection, this study focuses on their combined use, 
human-machine team pairing. Human-only techniques and machine-only techniques will be 
discussed but remain outside the scope of this research. This study focuses primarily on integrating 
currently existing non-invasive technology and algorithms into a joint cognitive system that 
includes both human and machine agents. To investigate, I draw on two major themes within the 
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discipline of psychology: 1) the development of trust between humans and machines; and 2) the 
impact of interview styles during interrogations.  
D. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
This thesis includes five chapters. The first chapter provides an overview of the problem, 
its relevance, and then discusses the scope of study. The second chapter identifies the DOD’s and 
Marine Corps’ current approach to deception detection. Additionally, it explores the current 
tactics, techniques, and procedure implemented by military police (MP), interrogators, and 
intelligence gathering professionals. It identifies a heavy focus on human-only deception detection 
methodologies, through interviewing styles, while also providing employment strategies for older 
less reliable technologies such as the polygraph. Employing this approach towards deception 
detection, requires the acceptance of a higher-than-necessary risk for tactical leaders. Because 
there have been technological advances made towards accurately identifying deception, the Marine 
Corps and the DOD should employ that technology to reduce the risk which tactical leaders must 
accept on the battlefield. The scholarly works reviewed provides an understanding of the enabling 
technologies including sensors, algorithms, and the human components needed for the proposed 
deception detection system.  
The third chapter details the proposed integrated deception detection system designed for 
use with detainee interrogations by the Marine Corps, WILDS, and its proposed employment 
model. The proposed system takes a cognitive systems engineering modeling approach, to create 
an OFM. The approach selected enables us to model human-machine interaction, human-human 
interaction, and the overall system. Other approaches and models to design a system failed to 
consider either the human element, the machine element, or where the human and machine 
elements overlapped. Additionally, this model will help identify potential design flaws, training 
requirements, and qualification standards associated with the human role in automated deception 
detection.  
The fourth chapter provides a detailed analysis of OFM employment with specific focus 
on key roles and responsibilities of humans and machines. This chapter will also discuss the 
potential benefits and limitations. Finally, Chapter V presents the conclusions and 
recommendations for further research into this topic.  
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II. STATE OF THE FIELD 
A. CURRENT MILITARY APPROACH TO DECEPTION DETECTION  
1. Department of Defense / U.S. Army Doctrine 
International Law, Joint and Service level doctrine provide insight into the DOD’s current 
approach to detecting deception. The Geneva Conventions and various Joint and Army 
publications provide relevant information regarding the rights of prisoners of war, the detention 
process, and current practices used by DOD intelligence personnel to gather information. 
Additionally, these publications provide current deception detection methodologies which assist 
in the collection of valuable information.  
a. Geneva Conventions 
The Geneva Conventions are international treaties which govern how members of the 
treaties will conduct warfare, and the rights of those who engage in warfare.6 There are four articles 
of the Geneva Conventions which apply to prisoners of war. JP 3-63 explains these four articles 
and their application to the Joint Forces.  
(1) Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and 
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (GWS) (2) Geneva Convention for the 
Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of 
Armed Forces at Sea (3) The Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of 
Prisoners of War (GPW)… (4) The Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection 
of Civilian Persons in Time of War (GC).7  
Article 1 details the protections for those who were previously engaging in hostile actions 
on the battlefield, but due to injury or illness, they are no longer actively hostile. Additionally, it 
sets forth the rights for the collection of human remains and prohibits their abuse. Article 2 details 
the protections for those shipwrecked. It requires the humane treatment and rescue of persons at 
sea and the procedure for death at sea. Article 3 details the rights of enemy prisoners of war (EPW), 
 
6 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Detainee Operations, JP 3-63 (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2014), 
https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_63.pdf. 
7 Joint Chiefs of Staff, 15. 
6 
regulating their detention, facilities and treatments. Article 4 details the rights of civilians detained 
due to enemy actions. This article applies when non-state actors are involved in hostile actions. 
Articles 3 and 4 clearly prohibit the use of torture on any EPW or any persons detained by those 
adhering to the treaty.   
There are two major implications from this. First is that prisoners of war (POW’s) have 
rights that the U.S. must adhere to by International Law. Torture is strictly prohibited.8 Second, to 
expect an enemy to treat our friendly forces with dignity and respect, we must afford their detainees 
basic human rights. Not only does this foster a moral high ground, but to some degree, it provides 
a level of protection for friendly forces engaged in combat operations.    
b. Joint Publication’s 3–63: Detainee Operations  
Joint Publication 3-63, Detainee Operations, initially provides a background and legal 
considerations for the detainee operations. It then goes on to explain the detainee categories, as 
illustrated in Figure 1, defining each category subsequently.  
The word “detainee” include any person captured, detained, or otherwise under the 
control of DOD personnel…Belligerent: a person who is engaged in hostilities 
against the U.S. or its multinational partners during an armed conflict…Privileged 
belligerents are EPWs upon capture, and are entitled to combatant immunity for 
their lawful pre-capture war-like acts…Unprivileged enemy belligerents are 
belligerents who do not qualify for the distinct privileges of combatant 
status…Retained Personnel. An individual who is described by Article 28 of the 
GWS and Article GPW and who is in the custody or control of DOD. Personnel 
who into the following categories: official med personnel of the armed forces of the 
parties to the conflict…Civilian Internee. Any civilian, including those described 
by Article 4 of GC, who is in the custody or control of DOD during an armed 
conflict or occupation, such as those held for imperative reasons of security or 
protection. 9  
Following the defining of detainee categories JP 3-63 proceeds to explains the processes 
relating to the conduct of detainee operations, including the capture, screening processes, and the 
disposition, classification, and approval process. It is through this process by which intelligence 
 
8 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Detainee Operations. 
9 Joint Chiefs of Staff, 17. 
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personnel have access to the detainees and begin to assess if gathering viable intelligence 
information is possible.  
 
Figure 1. Detainee Categories10 
c. U.S. Army Field Manual 2-22.3: Human Intelligence Collection Operations 
The U.S. Army Field Manual 2-22.3 (FM 2-22.3), Human Intelligence Collection 
Operations, provides three primary points of discussion. First, it provides an overview of the entire 
HUMINT process. Second, it provides the current recommendations for approach techniques and 
questioning methodologies. Finally, it provides insight into how to detect deceit.  
The HUMINT collections process begins with screening. Essentially, all human sources 
have the potential to provide valuable information during times of warfare. The screening process 
not only identifies who may have the requisite knowledge; that friendly forces are seeking, but 
also who may be willing to share that information. After the screening process, an intelligence 
professional proceeds with collection planning and preparation informed by research. The research 
conducted usually pertains to background information regarding the interviewee, operational 
 
10 Source: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 17. 
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information, or basic verifiable information. The collections plan includes the approach, the 
questioning methodology, and resources necessary to verify all information gathered.11 The final 
preparations are typically administrative items such as coordination for an interview room, 
coordination to use a polygraph, obtaining any equipment necessary, or coordinating the use of an 
interpreter. After completing the planning phase, the intelligence professional moves into the 
execution phase, which includes the actual approach, questioning, and reporting. The collections 
process ends with an analysis of the information gained, and the application of it for follow-on 
operations.  
FM 2-22.3 states the objective of the approach phases is: “to establish a relationship with 
the source [detainee] that results in the source providing accurate and reliable information in 
response to the HUMINT collector’s questions.” 12 Importantly, it emphasizes the necessity to 
build rapport with the detainee and provides various approach methodologies to do so. Once the 
intelligence professional has built rapport with the detainee, various questioning approaches can 
be taken to gain intelligence information. Listed below are the various questioning approaches 
with a brief description.  
• Direct Approach- Essentially, this approach begins with control-type questions 
and then transitions to pertinent questions posed.13 
• Incentive Approach- This approach has the collector trade something the source 
wants for the information given.14 
• Emotional Approaches- These set of approaches use emotional vulnerabilities to 
gain information. Typically, interviewers leverage incentives.15  
 
11 Department of the Army, Human Intelligence Collector Operations, FM 2-22.3 (Washington, DC: 
Department of the Army, 2006), 133, https://fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm2-22-3.pdf. 
12 Department of the Army, 140. 
13 Department of the Army, 144. 
14 Department of the Army, 145. 
15 Department of the Army, 146. 
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• We Know All- Interviewer suggest to the detainee that they are already aware of 
the information provided.16 
• File and Dossier-The interviewer prepares a file which has an excess of 
information to present in the interview. When paired with We Know All and 
extensive research it can be effective.17 
• Repetition- Used to induce cooperation from hostile detainee, essentially asking 
the same question continuously until the detainee answers.18 
• Rapid Fire- Multiple interviewers asking questions rapidly to cause flustering in 
the detainee which may result in detailed explanation.19 
• Silent- Interviewer uses silence to make the detainee speak due to discomfort.20  
• Change of Scenery- Moving the detainee from either an intimidating atmosphere 
to one of less intimidation, or the reverse.21  
• Mutt and Jeff- Using two interviewers with opposite dispositions to create a 
situation where the detainee builds rapport with one of them.22 
• False Flag- Interviewer poses as a non-U.S. military personnel to gain 
cooperation.23 
 
16 Department of the Army, 152. 
17 Department of the Army, 153. 
18 Department of the Army, 154. 
19 Department of the Army, 154. 
20 Department of the Army, 154. 
21 Department of the Army, 155. 
22 Department of the Army, 155. 
23 Department of the Army, 156. 
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From the list of approaches, we notice that all but the direct approach relies on emotional 
based techniques to manipulate the detainee’s willingness to share information. Relying heavily 
on emotional control by the interviewer presents challenges. These challenges include loss of 
control due to detainee actions or inactions, extreme stress due to warfare conditions, and other 
situational causations. The consequences can include bolstering the detainee unwillingness to 
respond, loss of established rapport, or even the accidental use of torture methods.24   
FM 2-22.3 explains that within the various approaches there are different types of questions 
including, initial, follow-up, non-pertinent repeat, control, and prepared.25 Each type of question 
has a purpose relating to the gathering of information. Additionally, it suggests avoiding leading, 
negative, compound, and vague questions.26 
Finally, FM 2-22.3 details a framework for how to detect deception with examples of 
application.   
• Repeat and control questions.  
• Internal inconsistencies. Frequently when a source is lying, the HUMINT 
collector will be able to identify inconsistencies in the timeline, the 
circumstances surrounding key events, or other areas within the questioning. 
For example, the source may spend a long time explaining something that took 
a short time to happen, or a short time telling of an event that took a relatively 
long time to happen. These internal inconsistencies often indicate deception.  
• Body language does not match verbal message. An extreme example of this 
would be the source relating a harrowing experience while sitting back in a 
relaxed position. The HUMINT collector must be careful in using this clue since 
body language is culturally dependent. Failing to make eye contact in the U.S. 
is considered a sign of deceit while in some Asian countries it is considered 
polite.  
• Knowledge does not match duty position or access. Based on the source’s job, 
duty position, or access the HUMINT collector should have developed a basic 
idea of the type and degree of information that an individual source should 
know. When the source’s answers show that he does not have the expected level 
of information (too much or too little or different information than expected), 
this may be an indicator of deceit. The HUMINT collector needs to determine 
the source of unexpected information.  
 
24 Vrij et al., “Psychological Perspectives on Interrogation.” 
25 Department of the Army, Human Intelligence Collector Operations. 
26 Department of the Army. 
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• Information is self-serving. Reporting of information that is self-serving to an 
individual or his group should be suspect. For example, a member of one ethnic 
group reporting generic atrocities by an opposing ethnic group or a source 
reporting exactly the right information needed to receive a promised incentive 
should be suspect. That is not to say that the information is necessarily false, 
just that the HUMINT collector needs to be sure to verify the information.  
• Lack of extraneous detail. Often false information will lack the detail of truthful 
information, especially when the lie is spontaneous. The HUMINT collector 
needs to ask follow-up questions to obtain the detail. When the source is unable 
to provide the details that they should know, it is an indicator of deceit. If the 
source does provide this additional information, it needs to be checked for 
internal inconsistencies and verified by repeat questions.  
• Repeated answers with exact wording and details. Often if a source plans on 
lying about a topic, he will memorize what he is going to say. If the source 
always relates an incident using exactly the same wording or answers repeat 
questions identically (word for word) to the original question, it may be an 
indicator of deceit. In an extreme case, if the source is interrupted in the middle 
of a statement on a given topic, he will have to start at the beginning in order to 
“get his story straight.”  
• Source appearance does not match story. If the source’s physical appearance 
does not match his story, it may be an indication of deceit. Examples of this 
include the source who says he is a farmer but lacks calluses on his hands or the 
supposed private who has a tailored uniform.  
• Source’s language usage does not match story. If the type of language, 
including sentence structure and vocabulary, does not match the source’s story, 
this may be an indicator of deceit. Examples of this include a farmer using 
university level language or a civilian using military slang.  
• Lack of technical vocabulary. Every occupation has its own jargon and 
technical vocabulary. If the source does not use the proper technical vocabulary 
to match his story, this may be an indicator of deceit. The HUMINT collector 
may require the support of an analyst or technical expert to identify this type of 
deceit.  
• Physical cues. The source may display physical signs of nervousness such as 
sweating or nervous movement. These signs may be indicators of deceit. The 
fact that an individual is being questioned may in itself be cause for some 
individuals to display nervousness. The HUMINT collector must be able to 
distinguish between this type of activity and nervous activity related to a 
particular topic. Physical reaction to a particular topic may simply indicate a 
strong emotional response rather than lying, but it should key the HUMINT 
collector to look for other indicators of deceit.  
• Failure to answer the question asked. When a source wishes to evade a topic, 
he will often provide an answer that is evasive and not in response to the 
question asked. For example, if the source is asked, “Are you a member of the 
insurgent organization?” and he replies, “I support the opposition party in the 
legislature,” he has truthfully answered a question, but not the question that was 
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asked. This is a subtle form of deceit since the source is seemingly cooperative 
but is in fact evading providing complete answers.27 
We can draw two primary conclusions from this evidence. First, the DOD has various ways 
of approaching and questioning a detainee. However, the majority of these tactics use emotion-
based logic, to persuade the detainee to provide information. Second, the interviewer has three 
tasks to accomplish simultaneously in an interview; control of the situation, gain pertinent 
information, and detect any deception which the detainee maybe attempting.  
2. Marine Corps 
The Marine Corps adheres to all the tactics and procedures outlined in the previous section. 
In addition to complying with the Joint Doctrine the Marine Corps has its own doctrine, Marine 
Corp Warfighting Publication 2–6 (MCWP 2-6), Counterintelligence. The Marine Corps 
traditionally operates as a component of the Joint Force. Because of the legal and sensitive nature 
of detention operations, most interviews occur at joint detention facilities, run by the U.S. Army. 
As such, the Marine Corps’ primary role is typically conducting tactical CI.28 This is the process 
by which the initial screening occurs after capture. Upon the transfer of the detainee from the care 
of the Marines into the care of the detention facility, the information collected during the tactical 
CI interview informs further HUMINT operations. Specifically, this information informs joint-
level intelligence professionals on which detainees maybe the best candidates for further 
questioning.  
3. Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) -203 
ICD-203 is a directive given to all intelligence professionals by the Director of National 
Intelligence. Designed to standardize the intelligence analyst’s products across all communities, it 
contributes to analysis and products produced by intelligence professionals. The directive 
“establishes the Intelligence Community Analytic Standards that govern the production and 
evaluation of analytic products; articulates the responsibility of the intelligence analysts to strive 
 
27 Department of the Army, 168–70. 
28 US Marine Corps, Counterintelligence, MCWP 2-6 (Quantico, VA: U.S. Marine Corps, 2004), 109–12, 
https://www.marines.mil/Portals/1/Publications/MCWP%202-6%20W%20Erratum%20Counterintelligence.pdf. 
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for excellence, integrity, and rigor in their analytic thinking and work practices.”29 Additionally, 
the directive establishes two primary outputs: a likelihood or probability level and a confidence 
level. The likelihood level is a measurement of an event occurring. Table 1 is the example provided 
in ICD-203 illustrating three examples of assessing the likelihood/probability levels.30 The table 
presents seven categories of likeliness for an event to occur and three options on how an analysist 
can verbalize the assessment, in chance, in probability, and in assigned percentages. This enables 
the analyst to present the information in either a qualitative or quantitative form. The second 
category is the confidence level. The confidence level provides the user and indication on the logic 
behind why the analysts assigned a probability level. The assessment of the confidence level can 
be based on the types of sources used in gathering the information, the timeliness of the 
information gathered, or the even the gathering processes used. Combining these two outputs 
together gives the user of the intelligence information gathered two standards by which they can 
rely on the information provided to them. HUMINT intelligence products comply with these 
standards, including those produced during detainee operations.  
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Now that we have a better understanding of the DOD’s and Marine Corps’ doctrine relating 
to deception detection, we can analyze how this doctrine was established. 
 
29 Director of National Intelligence, Analytic Standards, IC Directive 203 (Washington, DC: Office of the 
Director of National Intelligence, 2015), 1, https://fas.org/irp/dni/icd/icd-203.pdf. 
30 Director of National Intelligence, 3. 
31 Adapted from Director of National Intelligence, 3. 
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B. HISTORICAL DECEPTION DETECTION AND THE POLYGRAPH 
History provides a strong foundation to analyze how the current practices developed 
overtime. So, how did the IC, DOD, and Marine Corps arrive with these standards for detainee 
operations and deception detection methodologies? To answer this within the next section, we 
review historic interviewing methodologies used by the IC, DOD, and Marine Corps and the 
history and current doctrine of the polygraph.   
1. Interviewing Methodologies 
Previous scholarship outlines varying methodologies to elicit information from a detainee. 
I summarize those most commonly discussed in the literature along with the most commonly used 
practices. These include physical coercion (torture), psychological coercion (the Reid model), and 
rapport-based strategies (PEACE model and cognitive interview).  
a. Physical Coercion 
Torture is legally defined as, “specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain 
or suffering.”32 The term “severe” is further defined as “excruciating or agonizing pain or pain 
equivalent in intensity to the pain accompanying serious physical injury such as organ failure, 
impairment of bodily function or even death.”33 Concurrent medical definition of torture is “an 
act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a 
person, for a purpose such as obtaining information or confession, punishment, intimidation, 
coercion, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind.”34 As we can see there are 
differences between what medical professionals and legal professionals consider torture. There is 
also subjectivity relating to what constitutes pain, physical or mental, for individuals. For these 
reasons, it is difficult in some cases to define what does and does not constitute acts of torture. To 
best apply both of these definitions into a single concept, we define torture as the process by which 
force, or the threat of force is used in order to elicit information from a detained person.  
 
32 “Definition of Torture,” 18 § 2340–2340A (2004), https://www.justice.gov/file/18791/download. 
33 Definition of Torture. 
34 Jay W. Marks, “Medical Definition of Torture,” MedicineNet, June 3, 2021, 
https://www.medicinenet.com/torture/definition.htm. 
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Throughout history torture has been used for three primary purposes; to illicit a fear 
response which will produce “valuable” information, to intimidate, and to create propaganda.35 
As such, torture conducted by uniformed personnel is strictly prohibited by International Law, 
covered in the Geneva Conventions as well as Joint Publications, and service doctrine.36 The use 
of torture not only is subject to punishment by the UCMJ but it is also considered a war crime and 
can therefore can be adjudicated by the International Criminal Courts. Additionally, various 
studies have shown that the use of torture is an ineffective way of gaining information, despite 
popular opinion.37 This is inclusive of combating insurgencies, attempting to protect friendly 
forces, and for the purposes of major combat operations.38 We see each use of torture being 
ineffective through analyzing the effects of Operation TEARDROP during World War II, 
Operation Condor in the 1970s, and the Abu Ghraib incident during the Iraq War. It is for these 
various reasons that the use of torture during the conduct of CI operations is not only illegal but 
unproductive.  
b. Psychological Coercion 
A step up from physical coercion is psychological coercion. Essentially, this the process 
by which no physical contact occurs, but rather the are questions asked and psychological pressure 
put on a detainee elicits information. One of the primary models used to create this psychological 
pressure is the Reid Model. Though this model can be employed by the IC, DOD, and Marine 
 
35 Vrij et al., “Psychological Perspectives on Interrogation.” 
36 Department of the Army, Human Intelligence Collector Operations; U.S. Marine Corps, 
Counterintelligence; Joint Chiefs of Staff, Detainee Operations. 
37 Vrij et al., “Psychological Perspectives on Interrogation”; Houck et al., “When Beliefs Lead to (Im)Moral 
Action”; Joeann M. Salvati and Shannon C. Houck, “Examining the Causes and Consequences of Confession-
Eliciting Tactics during Interrogation,” Journal of Applied Security Research 14, no. 3 (July 3, 2019): 241–56, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/19361610.2019.1621508; Christopher Michael Sullivan, “The (in)Effectiveness of Torture 
for Combating Insurgency,” Journal of Peace Research 51, no. 3 (May 1, 2014): 388–404, 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343313520023; Ronnie Janoff-Bulman, “Erroneous Assumptions: Popular Belief in the 
Effectiveness of Torture Interrogation,” Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology 13, no. 4 (November 
2007): 429–35, http://dx.doi.org.libproxy.nps.edu/10.1080/10781910701665766. 
38 Janoff-Bulman, “Erroneous Assumptions”; Salvati and Houck, “Examining the Causes and Consequences of 
Confession-Eliciting Tactics during Interrogation”; Houck et al., “When Beliefs Lead to (Im)Moral Action”; 
Sullivan, “The (in)Effectiveness of Torture for Combating Insurgency”; Vrij et al., “Psychological Perspectives on 
Interrogation.” 
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Corps, in recent years the influence of scholarly work has reduced its use. The Reid Model is an 
accusatorial method which has three parts: factual analysis, interviewing, and interrogation. 
During the factual analysis, the interviewer asks standard questions to establish a control reference 
of the detainee’s behavior, as well as basic facts of event occurrence. Following that is a behavior 
analysis interview. The interviewer’s task is to purposefully cause the detainee to lie or tell the 
truth. They observe any changes in physical or language pattern characteristics which the detainee 
displays. Once the interviewer has observed behavioral pattern changes not associated with the 
relevant event, they can transition to the interrogation stage. The purpose of this stage is to gain 
information which the detainee has but the interviewer lacks.39 One of the primary issues with this 
strategy is that it results in a high false confession rate. When applying that false information to 
the intelligence gathering process contamination occurs within the information provided to tactical 
leaders.  
c. Rapport-based Strategies  
As scholarly research continues to examine how to best gain accurate HUMINT from 
detained persons, rapport-based strategies are emerging as the best approach. Two of the most 
commonly used methods are the PEACE Model and the cognitive interview.  
The PEACE Model consists of the following steps: preparation and planning, engage and 
explain, account, closure, and evaluate.40 This methodology mirrors that which is currently used 
in doctrine.41 Essentially, the interviewer prepares to question the detainee, questions them using 
rapport building skills and active listening, upon completion any need for clarifications should be 
allowed and finally the interviewer should evaluate if any of the information gathered can be useful 
to follow on operations based on previous research. 
 
39 Salvati and Houck, “Examining the Causes and Consequences of Confession-Eliciting Tactics during 
Interrogation”; James Orlando, “Interrogation Techniques,” Office of Legislative Research, accessed June 4, 2021, 
https://www.cga.ct.gov/2014/rpt/2014-R-0071.htm. 
40 Orlando, “Interrogation Techniques.” 
41 Salvati and Houck, “Examining the Causes and Consequences of Confession-Eliciting Tactics during 
Interrogation”; Department of the Army, Human Intelligence Collector Operations; U.S. Marine Corps, 
Counterintelligence. 
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The Cognitive Interview Methodology has its foundation in psychology. It was developed 
in the 1970s and since then, has been used by various law enforcement and military personnel.42 
The technique is “a series of memory retrieval and communications techniques designed to 
increase the amount of information that can be obtained from an interviewee.”43 There are four 
main types of interview strategies: context reinstatement, report everything, variety of 
perspectives, and temporal order.44 Essentially, the methodology stimulates the area of recall for 
the brain and requires a significant amount of cognitive functionality using open-ended 
questioning tactics.45 In a meta-analysis study conducted by Amina Memon, Christian Meissner, 
and Joanne Fraser, “The Cognitive Interview: A Meta Analytic Review and Study Space Analysis 
of the Past 25 Years” observed that there is a “rather substantial increase in correct recall with the 
CI as compared with a structured interview.” 46 This suggests that the information gathered as part 
of rapport-based strategies may in fact be more useful to CI personnel than that of the other 
methodology of interviews. It is obvious that both methodologies are a better option than the use 
of physical or psychological coercion; however, the overall ability to detect deception remains at 
a 50% average.47  
2. Polygraph 
The use of a polygraph test is the only means which the DOD leverages to the presence of 
the physical responses typically associated with deception. Understanding its history, 
 
42 Keller-McNulty, “Quest for Truth: Deception and Intent Detection”; Salvati and Houck, “Examining the 
Causes and Consequences of Confession-Eliciting Tactics during Interrogation”; Amina Memon et al., “The 
Cognitive Interview: A Meta-Analytic Review and Study Space Analysis of the Past 25 Years,” Psychology, Public 
Policy, and Law 16, no. 4 (November 2010): 340–72, http://dx.doi.org.libproxy.nps.edu/10.1037/a0020518. 
43 Memon et al., “The Cognitive Interview,” 340. 
44 Memon et al., “The Cognitive Interview”; Aldert Vrij et al., “Increasing Cognitive Load to Facilitate Lie 
Detection: The Benefit of Recalling an Event in Reverse Order,” Law and Human Behavior 32, no. 3 (June 2008): 
253–65, http://dx.doi.org.libproxy.nps.edu/10.1007/s10979-007-9103-y; Keller-McNulty, “Quest for Truth: 
Deception and Intent Detection.” 
45 Keller-McNulty, “Quest for Truth: Deception and Intent Detection”; Memon et al., “The Cognitive 
Interview.” 
46 Memon et al., “The Cognitive Interview,” 357. 
47 Houck et al., “When Beliefs Lead to (Im)Moral Action”; Vrij et al., “Psychological Perspectives on 
Interrogation”; Pérez-Rosas et al., “Deception Detection Using Real-Life Trial Data.” 
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implementation procedure, results, and limitations is key to a comparison of current practices vice 
the implementation of emerging technologies.  
The idea of detecting deception has been around since lying has been around. Various 
historical examples can point to different cultures, times, and peoples using various abstract events 
to prove that the person in question is lying. From the Salem Witch Trials, to chewing rice powder 
in China, there has been a societal attempt to detect if a person is lying, with the assumption that 
lying is an emotional event.48 It is from this belief, paired with the advancement of medical 
technologies, that motivation for the polygraph’s invention was derived. The first iteration of it 
occurred in 1921, when John Larson attempted to create a device which accurately measured blood 
pressure, pulse rate, and respiration.49 The process behind this, which was tested by Larson, was 
to ask a subject a yes or no question; once there was an aggregated amount of data, the difference 
in a single profile suggested that individual with the differences was attempting to be deceptive.50 
From here, other devices similar to the one which John Larson created were adapted for mobility, 
but essentially since 1921, the premise of the polygraph has not changed.  
To employ a polygraph test, the DOD and Marine Corps have directives and doctrine 
establishing regulations. DOD Directive (DoDD) 5210.91, Polygraph and Credibility Assessment 
Procedures, set forth the authorized uses and rules for conducting an examination. MCWP 2-6 
provides operational context for the implementation and appropriate uses of the information 
gathered for intelligence professionals. 
Figure 2 illustrates the authorized uses of the polygraph for the DOD. It lists CI 
investigations and operations as an authorized use. DoDD 5210.91 lists the steps to be conducted 
as pre-test, data collection, test data analysis, and post-test. MCWP 2-6 concurs with this process. 
There are two types of tests: the Guilt Knowledge Test, also known as Concealed Information 
 
48 Don Grubin and Lars Madsen, “Lie Detection and the Polygraph: A Historical Review,” Journal of Forensic 
Psychiatry & Psychology 16, no. 2 (June 2005): 357–69, https://doi.org/10.1080/14789940412331337353. 
49 Grubin and Madsen, 360. 
50 Grubin and Madsen, 360–61. 
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Test, and Comparison Question Test.51 The possible results of the testing as used by DOD include 
No Deception Indicated, Deception Indicated, No opinion, No significant response, and Significant 
Response.52 These responses are congruent with the American Polygraph Association standards. 
MCWP 2-6, acknowledges the following list may affect the results of a polygraph.  
• Mental health disorder of any type. 
• History of heart or respiratory, circulatory, or nervous disorders.  
• Current medical disorder, including colds, allergies, or other conditions. 
• Drugs or alcohol use before the examination. 
• Mental or physical fatigue. 
• Pain or physical discomfort.53 
The research presents two outlooks on the results of the polygraph. The first typically is 
the outlook which states the polygraph is unable to accurately detect deception, rather it detects a 
physiological response to questions asked which produces inconsistent results. This is the position 
held by the U.S. Supreme Court.54 The second outlook is that with the proper training and 
questioning techniques the polygraph can increase the ability to detect deception from the average 
of 54% to 69.4%.55 
 
51 Charles R. Honts, Steven Thurber, and Mark Handler, “A Comprehensive Meta‐analysis of the Comparison 
Question Polygraph Test,” Applied Cognitive Psychology 35, no. 2 (March 2021): 411–27, 
https://doi.org/10.1002/acp.3779; Jerry A. Lewis and Michelle Cuppari, “The Polygraph: The Truth Lies Within,” 
Journal of Psychiatry & Law 37, no. 1 (Spring 2009): 85–92, https://doi.org/10.1177/009318530903700107. 
52 US Marine Corps, Counterintelligence; Department of Defense, Polygraph and Credibility Assessment 
Procedures, DoD Directive 5210.91 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2020), 
https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodi/521091p.pdf?ver=2019-04-22-104603-167. 
53 US Marine Corps, Counterintelligence. 
54 “The Truth About Lie Detectors (Aka Polygraph Tests),” American Psychological Association, August 5, 
2004, https://www.apa.org/research/action/polygraph. 
55 Honts, Thurber, and Handler, “A Comprehensive Meta‐analysis of the Comparison Question Polygraph 
Test”; Vrij et al., “Increasing Cognitive Load to Facilitate Lie Detection.” 
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Figure 2. Authorized Uses of the Polygraph56  
C. EMERGING MACHINE TECHNOLOGIES FOR DECEPTION DETECTION 
From the previous section we have a complete picture of the current practices within the 
DOD, Intelligence Community, and Marine Corps. We understand the history of these methods 
and their associated accuracy. In the following section we aim to analyze emerging technologies 
that increase the accuracy of detecting deception, including neuroimaging, video, audio, and other 
biometric technologies.  
1. Neuroimaging 
Neuroimaging is the process of measuring different forms of brain activity. Studies have 
shown that during deception events there is increase in the activity of the pre-frontal cortex.57 
There are three primary neuroimaging sensors used to detect changes in brain activity.58 The first 
is electroencephalogram (EEG), which measures electrical activity within the brain. The drawback 
 
56 Adapted from Department of Defense, Polygraph and Credibility Assessment Procedures. 
57 F. Andrew Kozel et al., “Detecting Deception Using Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging,” Biological 
Psychiatry 58, no. 8 (October 15, 2005): 605–13, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.biopsych.2005.07.040. 
58 S.A. Bunge and I. Kahn, “Cognition: An Overview of Neuroimaging Techniques,” in Encyclopedia of 
Neuroscience (Elsevier, 2009), 1063–67, https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-008045046-9.00298-9. 
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of this methodology is the limited special resolution. The second neuroimaging technique that 
scientist have used to study deception is functional magnetic resonance imaging, FMRI. This 
technique measures activation of brain regions through the measurement of blood flow. This 
technique is not practical for DOD combat operations due to the nature of the equipment required 
for its conduct. The equipment is cost prohibitive requiring highly specialized personnel and 
training to operate. The final and newest neuroimaging technique is functional near-infrared 
spectroscopy, FNIRS. This optical imaging technique is portable and measures blood flow; at a 
depth penetration of 3cm.59 For deception detection this penetration depth is sufficient. The DOD 
has funded deception detection studies to explore the implementation of EEG and FMRI 
techniques. The U.S. Navy demonstrated a capability to classify deception, utilizing EEG, with a 
median 95% statistical confidence with less than 1% error rate for a concealed information test.60 
Nongovernmental scientist have also conducted successful research in classifying deception for 
both EEG and FNIRS.61 Of these studies the most successful employed EEG capabilities alone to 
identify if a yes-no answer was an intentional deception. They found they were able to classify 
 
59 “FAQ on NIRS” NIRx Medical Technologies, accessed June 4, 2021, https://nirx.net/faq. 
60 Lawrence A. Farwell et al., “Brain Fingerprinting Classification Concealed Information Test Detects US 
Navy Military Medical Information with P300,” Frontiers in Neuroscience 8 (December 23, 2014), 
https://doi.org/10.3389/fnins.2014.00410. 
61 Jiang Zhang et al., “A Look Into the Power of FNIRS Signals by Using the Welch Power Spectral Estimate 
for Deception Detection,” Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 14 (January 18, 2021): 606238, 
https://doi.org/10.3389/fnhum.2020.606238; Marzieh Daneshi Kohan et al., “Interview Based Connectivity Analysis 
of EEG in Order to Detect Deception,” Medical Hypotheses 136 (March 2020): 109517, 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mehy.2019.109517; Marzieh Daneshi Kohan et al., “EEG/PPG Effective Connectivity 
Fusion for Analyzing Deception in Interview,” Signal, Image and Video Processing 14, no. 5 (July 2020): 907–14, 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11760-019-01622-1; Wenwen Chang et al., “Comparison of Different Functional 
Connectives Based on EEG during Concealed Information Test,” Biomedical Signal Processing and Control 49 
(March 2019): 149–59, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.bspc.2018.12.008; Haizhou Leng et al., “Sophisticated Deception in 
Junior Middle School Students: An ERP Study,” Frontiers in Psychology 9 (January 11, 2019): 2675, 
https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2018.02675; Yijun Xiong, junfeng Gao, and Ran Chen, “Connectivity Network 
Analysis of EEG Signals for Detecting Deception,” Journal of Physics: Conference Series 1176 (March 2019): 
032051, https://doi.org/10.1088/1742-6596/1176/3/032051; Zhen Yuan and Xiaohong Lin, “Mapping of the Brain 
Activation Associated with Deception Using Fused EEG and FNIRS,” in Neural Imaging and Sensing 2019, ed. 
Qingming Luo, Jun Ding, and Ling Fu (Neural Imaging and Sensing 2019, San Francisco, United States: SPIE, 
2019), 14, https://doi.org/10.1117/12.2508257; Roberto Vega et al., “Hemodynamic Pattern Recognition During 
Deception Process Using Functional Near-Infrared Spectroscopy,” Journal of Medical and Biological Engineering 
36, no. 1 (February 2016): 22–31, https://doi.org/10.1007/s40846-016-0103-6; Junfeng Gao et al., “A Novel 
Algorithm to Enhance P300 in Single Trials: Application to Lie Detection Using F-Score and SVM,” ed. Hans A. 
Kestler, PLoS ONE 9, no. 11 (November 3, 2014): e109700, https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0109700. 
22 
deception with a 99.85% accuracy.62 Studies pertaining to FNIRS indicated a capability of 
classifying deception with a 95.63% accuracy.63 However, neither of these results mimicked 
battlefield usage. More realistic battlefield conditions resulted in a lower accuracy rate of 
approximately 84%.64 Through combining both EEG and FNIRS, improvement in deception 
detection occurs.65 Overwhelming neuroimaging is still possible. In one study, which compared 
frequent liars to infrequent lairs, they showed that infrequent liar’s attempts at deception were 
easier to classify when compared to those who frequently lie.66 This means those trained in evasion 
tactics maybe able to employ them more effectively without detection.  
2. Natural Language Processing 
Natural Language Processing (NLP) is a subcomponent of artificial intelligence which 
enables machines to understand human languages. One potential application of NLP is the analysis 
of speech patterns during an interrogation to gauge deception. Though various studies suggest 
different methodologies and approaches, they are mostly inclusive of contextual applications such 
as word count and sentence count, or various other linguistics attributes such as repetition, 
complexity, and uncertainty.67 The DOD services and its research-based infrastructure has not 
 
62 Xiong, Gao, and Chen, “Connectivity Network Analysis of EEG Signals for Detecting Deception.” 
63 Vega et al., “Hemodynamic Pattern Recognition During Deception Process Using Functional Near-Infrared 
Spectroscopy.” 
64 Daneshi Kohan et al., “EEG/PPG Effective Connectivity Fusion for Analyzing Deception in Interview”; 
Vega et al., “Hemodynamic Pattern Recognition During Deception Process Using Functional Near-Infrared 
Spectroscopy.” 
65 Yuan and Lin, “Mapping of the Brain Activation Associated with Deception Using Fused EEG and FNIRS.” 
66 Fang Li et al., “Lie Detection Using FNIRS Monitoring of Inhibition-Related Brain Regions Discriminates 
Infrequent but Not Frequent Liars,” Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 12 (March 13, 2018): 71, 
https://doi.org/10.3389/fnhum.2018.00071. 
67 Christie M. Fuller, David P. Biros, and Rick L. Wilson, “Decision Support for Determining Veracity via 
Linguistic-Based Cues,” Decision Support Systems 46, no. 3 (February 2009): 695–703, 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.dss.2008.11.001; Jeffrey T. Hancock et al., “On Lying and Being Lied To: A Linguistic 
Analysis of Deception in Computer-Mediated Communication,” Discourse Processes 45, no. 1 (December 17, 
2007): 1–23, https://doi.org/10.1080/01638530701739181; Victoria L. Rubin and Tatiana Lukoianova, “Truth and 
Deception at the Rhetorical Structure Level,” Journal of the Association for Information Science and Technology 66, 
no. 5 (2015): 905–17, https://doi.org/10.1002/asi.23216; Pérez-Rosas et al., “Deception Detection Using Real-Life 
Trial Data”; Lina Zhou et al., “Automating Linguistics-Based Cues for Detecting Deception in Text-Based 
Asynchronous Computer-Mediated Communications,” Group Decision and Negotiation 13, no. 1 (January 2004): 
81–106. 
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directly tied counterintelligence operations and NLP together to study statement accuracy; 
however, there  are two studies regarding the DOD’s use of all artificial intelligence capabilities, 
and both recommend the continuation of research into artificial intelligence and NLP.68 Linguistic 
Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC) is one of the most common commercially available programs 
currently used. Essentially the user inputs a string of text, and the program analyzes it and 
compares it to a dictionary. Based on the various categories of requested analysis, it produces a 
percent-based result.69 Outside military researchers, various other professionals are assessing the 
results of applying NLP to deception detection. Though studies vary from 60% to 74% accuracy, 
based on the approach, type of text, and algorithms used, the consensus is that natural language 
processing can help identify deception.70  
3. Other Biometric Monitoring 
In addition to neuroimaging and NLP, there are other technologies that studies have shown 
may produce more accurate results in attempting to detect deception. One is audio analysis, which 
includes frequency and pitch characterizations. Facial expression analysis, including facial 
expression, micro-facial expressions, and eye tracking, has been studied. Body language analysis, 
including hand gestures, head nodding, and posture is another studied technique. Thermal imaging, 
heart rate monitoring, and various other methodologies have also been studied.71 
D. ALGORITHMS 
To produce a desired output, the raw data collected by the various sensors needs 
processing. To do this, there are various algorithms that can be employed to remove noise and 
classify between deceptive and non-deceptive events. For example, the literature showed that 
 
68 Kristin E. Schaefer et al., “A Meta-Analysis of Factors Influencing the Development of Trust in Automation: 
Implications for Human-Robot Interaction:” (Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center, July 1, 
2014), https://doi.org/10.21236/ADA607926; Potember, “Perspectives on Research in Artificial Intelligence and 
Artificial General Intelligence Relevant to DoD.” 
69 “How It Works,” LIWC, accessed June 5, 2021, http://liwc.wpengine.com/how-it-works/. 
70 Rubin and Lukoianova, “Truth and Deception at the Rhetorical Structure Level”; Hancock et al., “On Lying 
and Being Lied To”; Pérez-Rosas et al., “Deception Detection Using Real-Life Trial Data.” 
71 Keller-McNulty, “Quest for Truth: Deception and Intent Detection”; Pérez-Rosas et al., “Deception 
Detection Using Real-Life Trial Data.” 
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classifiers using linear discriminant analysis, support vector machines and convolutional neural 
networks could all successfully classify deception when processing brain signals.72 In order for 
NLP to successfully classify deception, various raw data inputs are provided to algorithms which 
constitute programs and toolkits. These algorithms conduct a comparison of known information to 
the entry. The most used algorithms are keyword extractions, named entity recognition, topic 
modelling, and knowledge graphs.73 From video signals scientists can use eye movement and 
facial expressions to classify deceptive events. For facial expressions, the use of traditional 
statistical methods like multivariate regression and Bayesian Methods is common, in addition to 
more modern methods like the Convolutional Neural Networks.74 These various algorithms are 
essentially what produces the data which can inform intelligence professionals if a detainee is 
attempting to be deceitful. Ensuring that parallel processing is available to minimize processing 
time and maximize feedback rates will be a critical element in any system looking to detect 
deception.  
 
72 Faryal Amber et al., “P300 Based Deception Detection Using Convolutional Neural Network,” in 2019 2nd 
International Conference on Communication, Computing and Digital Systems (C-CODE) (2019 2nd International 
Conference on Communication, Computing and Digital systems (C-CODE), Islamabad, Pakistan: IEEE, 2019), 
201–4, https://doi.org/10.1109/C-CODE.2019.8681025; Daneshi Kohan et al., “EEG/PPG Effective Connectivity 
Fusion for Analyzing Deception in Interview”; Daneshi Kohan et al., “Interview Based Connectivity Analysis of 
EEG in Order to Detect Deception”; Xiong, Gao, and Chen, “Connectivity Network Analysis of EEG Signals for 
Detecting Deception”; Vega et al., “Hemodynamic Pattern Recognition During Deception Process Using Functional 
Near-Infrared Spectroscopy.” 
73 “Top Natural Language Processing (NLP) Algorithms And Techniques For Beginners,” Programmer 
Backpack, June 21, 2020, https://programmerbackpack.com/top-natural-language-processing-nlp-algorithms-and-
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E. JOINT COGNITIVE SYSTEM AND HUMAN MACHINE TEAMING 
As technology has advanced, there are various sensing methods which may help 
intelligence professional gather accurate information through the detection of deception. However, 
attempting to replace the interviewer with a robot is unlikely to yield positive results. Building a 
system that leverages all the technological advances while keeping the interviewer in the loop may 
present the best solution to gain an asymmetrical advantage. To do this, we can investigate the 
Joint Cognitive System’s development which facilitates a machine and human team pair to achieve 
a goal.  
1. Joint Cognitive Systems Engineering: A Model for Human-Machine 
Teaming 
Systems engineering is defined as “a transdisciplinary and integrative approach to enable 
the successful realization, use, and retirement of engineered systems, using systems principles and 
concepts, and scientific, technological, and management methods.”75 It focuses on the 
development of a project’s life cycle inclusive of goals, purposes, needs, and design. It considers 
the people, end results, as well as processes which facilitate the accomplishment of goals.76 Our 
focus will be on defining anticipated customers’ needs and defining an operational concept by 
using methodologies related to Cognitive Systems Engineering (CSE) resulting in a Joint 
Cognitive System’s development.  
CSE is concerned with the modeling of human-machine interaction in such a way as to 
treat both human and machine agent(s) as individual “thinking” agents working together in a team 
in a given environment.77 This will facilitate both an interviewer being present as well as a 
machine that can help in detecting deception during the interview process. An essential component 
of cognitive engineering is human operator modeling. The goals of the modeling process are to 
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determine the type and style of information presented to the human user, and to establish the 
technical demands of the system in the context of the user’s needs.78 The primary resultant of CSE 
is a Joint Cognitive System, defined as “the combination of human problem solver and automation 
technologies which act as co-agents to achieve goals and objectives in a complex work domain.”79  
One way to help design teams create a system is to create a model of processes. The 
Operation Function Model (OFM), typically used in CSE, is a tool designed specifically to assist 
in cognitive engineering of human–computer systems. Organized hierarchically, the model 
structurally accounts for where the human operator focuses his or her attention during a complex 
task. It consists of nodes, representing operator tasks and functions, and arcs, representing 
triggering events that cause the operator to change to another task or function. Operator function 
models help the designing of decision aids for search-and-rescue missions, ship navigation, ground 
control of orbiting satellites, and information retrieval in a corporate environment.80 We selected 
the OFM for the development of this system because it captures the cognitive events that occur 
between human agents, between human and machine agents, and the transitions between those 
events. 
2. Human-Machine Trust 
For any Joint Cognitive System or human-machine team pair to be effective, a trusting 
relationship between the human and the machine is necessary.81 There is an extensive amount of 
psychological research regarding trust. As technology continues to emerge linking humans to 
machine more research is on-going to understand how a machine component will differ from the 
established human-to-human trust relationship.  
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Trust is defined as “the willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of another 
party based on the expectation that the other will perform a particular action important to the 
trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or control that other party.”82 A machine, which for 
the purposes of this research has reference to AI, is “a highly capable and complex technology that 
aims to simulate human intelligence.”83 The steps which the machine performs typically includes 
sensing the outside world, processing the raw sensed information, producing a result, and 
conducting an assessment of the results produced.84 It is critical to understand how different 
factors can affect the establishment, maintenance, and destruction of trust between human and 
machines that they team with.      
According to psychological research, there are two types of trust which influence the 
development of a trusting relationship between human and machine: cognitive and emotional. 
Cognitive trust usually is referring to the logical trust which can be developed through use and 
time through a clear understanding of the contractual roles which the human is expecting the 
machine to perform.85 Elements which influence this include previous experience with machines, 
competence and knowledge level in the task being perform, ease of use, as well as the expectations 
of the machine.86 Emotional trust usually refers to how the human participants feels about the 
machine. Factors of influence include, attitudes, confidence level, satisfaction, and comfort.87 
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Each of these factors needs consideration during the development phase to yield the most 
advantageous system. 
Like human trust relationships, the maintenance of a relationship between a human and 
machine is key, particularly in stressful situations. Warfare is inherently chaotic and therefore 
stressful. It is critical that during stress that a system designed to assist a uniformed military 
member in the conduct of their job will perform its assigned role. As a study conducted by Drs. 
Paul Robinette, Alan Wagner, and Ayanna Howard, suggests, self-reported trust in AI decreases 
53% when the AI committed a known error.88 Additionally, the report also suggested that there 
was a strong correlation between trust and a willingness to use the AI in time critical situations.89 
Further studies suggest that even outside of time critical situations, when a machine errors, this 
has a negative influence on the trust relationship, and the operator has a tendency to avoid use of 
the system.90 In order to prevent this, three primary training suggestions were made: 1) ensure that 
training with a system encompasses common errors or failures, 2) integrate realistic scenario based 
training to overcome hesitations to use automation after failure, and 3) ensure participants are 
educated on the system through a full understanding of capabilities and limitations.91  
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III. PROPOSED SYSTEMS MODEL: WILDS 
A. PROPOSED EMPLOYMENT MODEL  
Figure 3 presents the proposed employment model of Warfare Integrated Lie Detection 
System (WILDS). The model identifies three major players in the employment of WILDS: the 
enemy, the interviewer, and WILDS. Further discussion on the roles of each major player and the 
relationships between each of them will occur later in this section.  
 
Figure 3. Proposed Employment Model 
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Figure 4. Proposed Operator Function Model92 
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B. PROPOSED OPERATOR FUNCTION MODEL  
Figure 4 presents the proposed operator functional model for WILDS.93 The model 
sets the primary goal as detecting deception during EPW interrogations. It sets the 
functions for the machine sensors, such as the Brain Computer Interface (BCI), thermal 
imaging, heart rate sensors, and audio/visual inputs. The sub-functions are set as the 
algorithms required to process the raw data. The final action of the system produces a 
likelihood rating and associated confidence metric in compliance with the ICD-203.  
C. DISCUSSION OF OFM  
1. Overview 
WILDS’ operator function model, as illustrated in Figure 4, is an application of 
Joint Cognitive Systems Engineering. Essentially with an identified goal, the model 
enables the development of functions and subfunctions which supports an action to achieve 
the identified goal. We selected this form of modeling for two primary reasons. The first is 
because it is a goal-oriented model. Goal-oriented models facilitate keeping the focus on a 
defined end-state, rather than task-oriented models which focus on key performance 
metrics. The difference allows for more creative and innovative solutions development, 
regardless of who or what is performing each task to achieve the goal. This ties directly to 
the second reason, which is OFM facilitates human and machine interactions. Many other 
system model designs rely on the premise that either a human or a machine will achieve a 
goal independently. The OFM, however, recognizes there are tasks which are better suited 
for machines. Those tasks inform human decisions. Rather than designing a system 
discounting either the human or machine element, OFM leverages what a machine can do 
and provides a design which considers how the human will interact with the machine in 
order to achieve the defined end state.94 In doing this the model considers both the 
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capabilities and limitation for the human and for the machine, permitting the machine to 
provide the human with the necessary information while leaving the human to understand 
the context and make continued decisions based on the information provided.95 For these 
two reasons the operator function model was selected to develop WILDS.  
2. Goals 
The goal Figure 4 presents is detecting deception during detainee interviews. 
Because an OFM’s purpose is to identify each stage and functionality of a developed 
system, the goal identified presents the main purpose of the system. It’s development stems 
from identifying the problem space, examining current processes, examining current 
technologies, and finding areas for improvements. As Chapter II outlines, the problem 
space is the capability of human operators being able to accurately detect deception with 
the intent of using the information gathered from human intelligence sources for 
operational purposes. After examining the current processes and technologies within this 
field, one viable solution would be creating a machine which detects deception accurately 
and provides results in a timely manner. This machine’s design must include detecting 
deception accurately and providing its results to a human, who can leverage the results in 
a context enabling tactical leaders to make better decisions. It is from this goal that the 
design of the operational function model for WILDS promulgated from.     
3. Functions 
The functions section of the OFM explains the methodology of achieving the goal. 
In the case of WILDS, to detect deception there are various sensors which will be present 
during the interview process. These sensors include thermal imaging, audio feeds, video 
feeds, FNIRS, and EEG sensors. To achieve the goal, the interviewer sets up the sensors 
and records. They then ask the detainee questions, and the detainee responds. The sensors 
are detecting changes in heart rate, temperature, blood flow to the brain, electrical signals 
within the brain, vocal pitches, body positioning, and language used by the detainee. This 
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is the raw data input to WILDS. This data is subsequently processed in such a way that a 
computer can understand it.   
4. Subfunctions 
For the raw data to be meaningful it needs processing in such a way that the results 
produced after processing are interpretable by a human. Therefore, upon the receipt of the 
sensing data, various algorithms are applied to the processed data. These are the 
subfunctions of WILDS. They include the connectivity and coherence processing 
algorithm, the stress monitoring algorithm, facial/body language monitoring algorithm, and 
the natural language processing algorithms. Each of these algorithms produce a result that 
is indicative if the detainee is lying. It is based on this information that the final steps can 
occur, and the goal is achievable.   
5. Actions 
The actions section of the OFM combines all the outputs of the subfunctions 
together to produce a meaningful result. For WILDS, these final steps which occur is the 
combination of each algorithm into a single useable percentage provided to the interviewer. 
This percentage informs the interviewer of the likeliness that the detainee is attempting to 
be deceptive. Additionally, it informs the interviewer of a confidence level in that 
percentage. This confidence level is based on the number of functions and subfunctions 
implemented during the process. A high confidence level is indicative of all the sensors 
and algorithms employment, while a low confidence level is indicative of either a sensor 
or algorithm failing to produce an initial result. These outputs are congruent with the 
requirements set forth in ICD-203, which ultimately enables further decisions made in the 
interview room.   
D. DISCUSSION OF PROPOSED EMPLOYMENT 
1. Overview 
The proposed employment model presented illustrates how WILDS can fits into 
EPW interviewers. The proposed model assumes that the HUMINT interviewer employing 
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WILDS has completed all necessary preparatory actions, including but not limited to 
coordinating and getting the approval for conducting the interview, planning the approach 
for questioning and responses, reserving a private interview room, setting up the interview 
room and sensors required for WILDS, and conducting a proper handover of the EPW with 
the proper military police handler. Upon completion of the handover, there are three 
pertinent relationships involved: the relationship between the prisoner and the interviewer, 
the relationship between the prisoner and WILDS, and the relationship between the 
interviewer and WILDS.  
For each relationship to be functional there is a flow of information which must 
occur. First, as indicated on Figure 3, WILDS must be sensing what the detainee is doing. 
Then the interviewer must ask a question. The type of question asked is dependent on the 
methodology by which the interviewer is working. Both closed ended—yes or no—or 
open-ended questions are acceptable for the use of WILDS. Once the prisoner responds to 
the question, the interviewer and WILDS processes that information. WILDS then 
produces a percentage of likeliness that the detainee is lying along with a confidence level 
in that percentage. The interviewer receives these results. Based on the training of the 
interviewer and the trust relationship built between WILDS and the interviewer, the 
interviewer would proceed with further planned questioning, adjusting for the honesty or 
lying occurring at the time. WILDS would continue to monitor and provide feedback on 
every question until the interview’s completion.        
2. Role of Enemy 
As discussed in Chapter II, there are three primary types of detainees which can 
provide useful information during an interview: an enemy-state actor, an enemy non-state 
actor (belligerent), and civilians (non-belligerent). Though there are various legal 
considerations for interviewing the different types of detainees, for effective 
counterintelligence gathering all detainees must provide a response. Therefore, the primary 
role of the detainee is to respond to the questions of the interviewer. Though on the surface 
this seems rather simple, two barriers may have a significant influence on if the detainee 
responds: failed communication and trained resistance.  
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Trained resistance to the interviewing process, traditionally seen in state or non-
state actors, is an attempt to protect the information they have. Typical resistance 
methodologies include failing to answer any questions posed regardless of by whom, 
failing to answer any question not related directly to their health or welfare, and providing 
only mandated requirements of the Geneva Conventions (name, rank, service number, and 
date of birth) when asked any questions. If these methodologies are being employed, the 
ability to gather intelligence through the employment of WILDS is drastically limited. 
Though the sensors are still able to monitor any changes that occur in the detainee, the 
reasons for these changes occurring cannot be correlated directly to a lie or intention to 
deceive. 
The second barrier to receiving a response is communication failure. Figure 5 
shows two paths of communication presented by Wilber Schramm.96 They illustrate that 
the recipient of the information must be able to understand questions posed to them. 
Therefore, if there is a foreign language involved, context from the questions is missing, 
or if there are multiple ways of interpreting a situation or question then the result may be 
no response to the questions posed by the interviewer. Being able to ensure that the 
pathways from is clear of any obstruction ensures clear communication and will yield better 
results for the interviewer.  
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Figure 5. Schramm’s Communication Model97 
3. Role of WILDS 
WILDS fits into the employment model as a member for the interviewing team. It 
works in conjunction with the interviewer, being able to detect changes in the detainee 
which are imperceivable to the human eye. These changes provide an indication that the 
detainee is lying or has the intent to be deceitful. If employed effectively this system can 
help to gather HUMINT from detainees which may be critical to operations conducted by 
military forces. To be employed effectively there are two primary inputs into WILDS and 
two primary outputs it provides.  
The two primary inputs into WILDS are the data collected by the sensors and the 
verbal response from the detainee. The data collected by the sensors is passive data, to 
include heart rate response, thermal imaging, and the other functions, as illustrated in 
Figure 4. For this input to be optimal, it should establish a baseline, meaning that the 
interviewer should have the sensors already turned on and working prior to the detainee 
answering any questions. This will allow the system to establish a baseline and then detect 
any changes regardless of verbal response from the detainee. The second input is the verbal 
response to the interviewer’s question from the detainee. The information analyzed in the 
verbal response includes, at minimum, a vocal analysis of pitch and language choice. 
Again, the sensors should be set prior to the detainee answering relevant questions to gain 
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a baseline. Additional to sensors being set prior to the detainee’s responses, the 
interviewer’s initial questions should provide a baseline to establish language patterns used 
by the detainee. The reasons these two inputs must remain separated is because the former 
requires only the presence of the detainee, while the later requires that the detainee provides 
a verbal response to the interviewer’s questions. Therefore, if the detainee is employing 
resistance tactics, as discussed in the previous section, the results may not be as accurate 
as when the detainee does at least provide an answer, deceptive or honest.  
As discussed in Chapter II, the Intelligence Community adheres to ICD-203, which 
requires analysist to provide a percentage of likeliness for an event to occur while also 
providing the confidence level in their assessment. As such, the two primary outputs of 
WILDS are the likeliness rating and the confidence rating. The likeliness rating WILDS 
would produce is a percentage on if the detainee is lying. 0% would indict a truthful answer, 
while 100% would indict that the detainee is lying. This would allow the interviewer to ask 
follow on questions, informed of what the detainee previous responses were. Additionally, 
WILDS would produce a confidence level. This confidence level would be based on the 
number of sensors applied. A reduction in the number of sensors applied to a single 
question would produce a lower confidence level output. One example of when the 
confidence level would be lower than 100% is if the detainee is applying resistance tactics 
to the interview. If the detainee fails to provide a response to the question, vocal analysis 
nor language processing occurs. The consequence is that the natural language processor 
and its congruent algorithms do not feed into the overall result. Therefore, the number of 
sensors contributing to the output would decrease, and the confidence level would reflect 
that decrease. The interviewer receives this percentage and confidence level near 
instantaneously.    
4. Role of Interviewer 
The interviewer is the other team member involved during the deception detection 
process. Though they remain the primary responsible party for the overall conduct of the 
interview, WILDS is performing the actual task of determining if a detainee is lying. Unlike 
either the detainee or WILDS the role of the interviewer starts prior to the interview and 
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finishes after processing the information gained in the interview. As such the interviewer’s 
roles has three sections: the preparation, the execution, and the results.  
Like the conduct of the preparation phase outlined in Chapter II, many of the 
responsibilities remain on the interviewer. This is inclusive of getting the approval to 
conduct the interview by the detention facility commanders, coordinating the interview 
room requirements, and developing an approach for the questions asked during the 
interview process.98 This last step, in particular, alters the conduct of the current processes. 
As explained in Chapter II, the current process of developing questions stems from the 
methodology employed. The interviewer selects a methodology they are most comfortable 
with, develops a list of potential questions to ask the detainee, and then moves into the 
execution phase. However, because there is an immediate feedback loop integrated into 
WILDS to inform the interviewer of deception, the ways which the interviewer develops 
question order changes from a list of questions to flow chart style. Figure 6 is a partial list 
of questions provided to counterintelligence specialists to help in the preparation of 
interview questions.99 Figure 7 illustrates what could be employed with WILDS providing 
feedback. The implementation of this plan would help to optimize time spent in the 
interview room as well as facilitate the gathering of information necessary for military 
operations.  
During the execution phase, the interviewer will have one output and two inputs, 
as depicted in Figure 3. The one output is the question directed at the detainee. We can see 
through the examination of Figure 7 that a proposed series of questions developed during 
the preparation phase would no longer rely on the detainee’s truthfulness, but rather the 
attempt to deceive would simply trigger a different line of questioning. An anecdotal 
example would follow along with Figure 7. The interviewer asks the initial question: What 
individual weapons does unit X have? The detainee’s answer produces a high likeliness 
and high confidence level of deception. Rather than repeating the question, the interviewer 
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proceeds with the following question: Does the unit have AK-47? The detainee answers 
no, again a high likeliness and confidence level of deception result. This would confirm 
that the enemy unit does have AK-47’s. Therefore, the attempt to deceive when detected 
could be just as informative as the detainee telling the truth. Due to the innate nature of 
EPW interviews, the interviewer is going to have two inputs the observed response of the 
detainee, and the assessment WILDS provides. Though the ultimate decision and 
responsibility will remain with the interviewer for the assessment on if the detainee is being 
deceitful, with the proper training the interviewer will learn to trust the inputs that WILDS 
provides. This will result in an increased likeliness of detecting deception by EPWs during 
interviews.  
 
Figure 6. Questioning Reference100 
 
100 Source: Department of the Army. 
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Figure 7. Question Diagram 
E. TRUST IN WILDS 
In Chapter II, we explored the current research regarding trust between humans and 
machines. From that exploration, three major conclusions are applicable to the 
implementation of WILDS and the ability to detect deception during EPW interviews.  
1. Clearly defining the responsibilities, capabilities, and limitation of the 
system to be employed can foster trust in a human-machine team pair.101  
2. Implementing scenario-based training that is tough and realistic can 
improve the trust relationship between the human and machine.102  
3. Within the training environment, purposefully causing errors for a valid 
reason will improve the trust relationship between human and machine.103  
Trust is a relationship formed between two entities in which each entity relies on 
the other to fulfill a set of understood responsibilities. As with any relationship, clearly 
defining what responsibilities are within the capacity of the trusted entity is one of the keys 
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to its success. Additionally, the trustee must clearly understand what realistic capabilities 
and limitations are for the trusted. Ultimately the trustee’s expectations have to be managed 
for trust to be established and retained.104 Figure 3 and its subsequent explanation clearly 
provides a set of responsibilities and designed outputs which WILDS is to provide to the 
interviewer during the execution phase. This includes accurately sensing various biometric 
elements of the detainee during the interview process and providing the interviewer with a 
percentage of likeliness that the detainee is attempting to be deceptive and an associated 
confidence level with that percentage. Through a clear identification of what WILDS’ roles 
are during the interview process, the process of developing trust within the interviewer-
WILDS team pair can begin.  
Once the interviewer understands the roles for which they are responsible and the 
roles for which WILDS is responsible, familiarization with employing WILDS in the 
toughest, yet most realistic environments can help to foster a trust relationship between the 
team pair. Prior to the execution of the tough realistic training event preparatory actions 
should occur. These preparatory actions should include education on the theory, including 
historical examples, if possible, familiarization events, and low stress employment 
opportunities. Each action works to develop the knowledge and understanding of the events 
expected to occur and provides a foundational reference for when situations do not match 
perfectly with training. Upon completion of these preparatory actions, tough realistic 
training scenarios should be employed. These scenarios should cover both the breadth and 
depth of problems which may occur in a realistic fashion. The scenario should attempt to 
induce a high level of stress for the personnel in training to complete an action. Upon the 
completion of the training scenario, there should be an in-depth review of decisions made 
and the congruent reasonings. This immediate review enables the development of trust 
between the human machine team (HMT) pair.  
Finally, for the establishment of a truly trusting relationship between the HMT pair 
a test should occur. The best way to do this is to purposefully cause WILDS to produce an 
inaccurate percentage of likeliness, in a scenario where that would be possible. One 
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example would be in a detainee attempting to employee evasive tactics through not 
providing any information. Though the system can monitor the detainee’s heart rate, 
temperature, blood flow, and electrical impulses, the refusal of the detainee to respond to 
a question may produce a result with lower confidence or a false positive. A potential result 
of this is distrust for WILDS. However, after working through this, the team pair will gain 
a better understanding of the limitations of WILDS. With this knowledge and experience, 
a higher level of trust and confidence is achievable so that when employed during a combat 





A. SUMMARY OF RESULTS 
This thesis identified a clear gap in HUMINT operations. The IC, DOD, and Marine 
Corps do not have a tool that enables high fidelity deception detection during 
interrogations. WILDS encompasses emerging sensor technologies and leverages 
advanced integration techniques. We demonstrate this human-machine teaming through an 
operator functional model. This model identified the goals of the system, the functions, 
sub-functions, and actions that operators would need to take to achieve the desired goals. 
The proposed system, WILDS, addresses the identified gap through leveraging various 
sensors inputs, fusing the collected data to produce a likelihood and confidence rating 
which can contribute to the interrogation and provide intelligence professionals with 
insight. To optimize the results, our proposal considered the interview and interrogation 
methodology as well as the trust relationship between the human agent and WILDS. The 
implementation of this proposal will translate into fewer casualties, reduced collateral 
damage, and improve the overall outcome in warfare for friendly forces.      
B. FUTURE WORK 
There are three major categories for future work: Future work on the development 
of WILDS, future work pertaining to employment options of WILDS, and future work 
regarding deception detection technologies.  
The next step in the development of WILDS would be the legal and ethical review. 
Following that verification, all parties involved in the implementation of WILDS—the 
interrogation teams, including military police and intelligence personnel—need to validate 
WILDS meets all the necessary requirements during interrogation operations. Upon 
completion of both reviews, the prototyping phase should begin. Prototyping development 
would require an in-depth knowledge on the following areas: BCI, thermal sensors, heart 
rate sensors, facial recognition, natural language processing, and the algorithms needed to 
integrate the data from these sensors. Additional considerations should include a basic 
understanding in material engineering, to build a field-ready system, and sensor processing. 
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The prototyping would consist of developing a single machine which would be present in 
the interrogation room and provided the inputs required for WILDS. Finally, a user-
friendly display would need development; this display would communicate both a 
likelihood rating and a confidence level to the operator. Upon the completion of 
prototyping WILDS, there would be a need for testing and evaluation. This testing and 
evaluation phase would need to include 1) testing the designed machine to ensure all 
sensors are functional in both the laboratory environment as well as in a field environment 
and 2) the comparison of human only vice the employment of WILDS deception detection.  
Separate from the future work on the development of WILDS would be the 
development of employment options for WILDS. This would include investigating other 
military applications, other intelligence community applications, and generally other 
government agencies. Future work could include the development of a variation on WILDS 
which could assist during Key Leader Engagements or other various Human Intelligence 
gathering operations where it would be critical to know if a person is lying outside of the 
interrogation room. Outside the military but still inside the Intelligence Community 
employing WILDS for the purpose of conducting interrogations or other Human 
Intelligence operations not specified to military operations, such as the identification of 
insider threats could be beneficial. Additionally, investigating if the same type of system 
is leverageable for the purposes of the Department of Homeland Security operations, 
Federal Bureau of Investigation criminal investigations, or even the local police force 
conducting criminal investigations. These domestic applications would again require both 
legal and ethical reviews to ensure the maintenance of rights to privacy.  
As various technologies continue to emerge and develop, it is critical that military 
planners and leaders continue to monitor their advancement for the purposes of leveraging 
them for deception detection. Fields of study which are continuing to develop rapidly 
include biometric sensors, cognitive science, and artificial intelligence. Additionally, any 
advancement in network security and computer security would also be of benefit to the 
deception detection field. Future work in any of these fields, while pairing it with the 
psychological perspectives on deception detection will provide continual advancements 
within this field.      
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C. FINAL THOUGHTS 
If, as Sun Tze asserts, all warfare is based on deception, then being able to detect 
deception provides a significant advantage on the battlefield. The DOD’s and the Marine 
Corps’ current approach to detecting deception during interrogation is as accurate as 
guessing heads or tails when flipping a coin. Improvement is both necessary and 
achievable. A system that can take advantage of the multiple biometric indicators present, 
in real time at the moment of deception, would fundamentally shift HUMINT operations. 
This is particularly the case if this system engenders trust by providing likelihood and 
confidence metrics to the operator. By leveraging these various technologies, integrating 
them into a dynamic system, and employing them with the purpose of detecting deception 
in enemy combatants, the DOD and Marine Corps can take what would be the flip of a coin 
and produce higher fidelity results, ultimately enhancing intelligence collected and 
counterintelligence operations.  
Within the discipline of systems engineering, there are various modeling 
approaches to systems designing. We selected the OFM as the best approach because it 
enables both human processes and machine processes modeling within a single design 
concept, contributing directly to achieving the goal of the model. Other various models fall 
short in modeling the human processes impact on the design of a given system. OFM is 
inclusive and holistic for human-machine team pairing system design.   
The DOD and the Marine Corps have the opportunity to gain an advantage over 
any enemy. Being able to detect deception when the stakes are high is just as critical as 
accurately inputting targeting data. On today’s battlefield, we rely heavily on human-
machine teams to do everything from monitoring maintenance to putting bombs on a target. 
Detecting deception can be no different. Employing a machine that can assist us in 
facilitating the gathering of information to be the best on the battlefield provides an 
asymmetric advantage.   
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